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Abstract I adapt the dynamic framework for vagueness of Barker 2002 to the
analysis of subjective taste predicates. I argue, following Kennedy 2013, that there
are two qualitatively distinct types of subjectivity in natural language, which I call
mapping subjectivity and (vague) standards subjectivity, and that the matrix predicate
find is sensitive to the distinction between them. Novel to the present analysis is the
proposal that find requires not just a complement that supports mapping subjectivity,
but also a context that supports nonvacuous entailments about those scalar mappings.
I part ways from Kennedy and from Barker 2013 in treating mapping subjectivity
as a fact of the world, unassimilable to the metalinguistic variety of subjectivity
associated with vague standards.
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1 Introduction
Recent work on the semantics of taste predicates, much of it responding to Lasersohn
2005, has sparked interest in the nature of subjectivity and its encoding in natural
language. One point of particular concern has been to understand the similarities
and differences between taste predicates like tasty and vague predicates like tall: are
there formal distinctions to parallel the intuitive contrast between the subjectivity
involved in judge-dependent taste assessment and the subjectivity involved in the de-
termination of vague standards, and are there linguistic diagnostics that might reveal
such distinctions? Sæbø (2009) and, following him, Kennedy (2013) have seized on
the behavior of the matrix predicate find as one such diagnostic, demonstrating that
the felicity of sentences with find patterns consistently with the presence of taste
predicates in its complement but not with the presence of ordinary vague predicates.
The matter of how best to craft a formal account of this observation is my
principal concern here. The simple version of the question is “what does find need
from its complement?” I follow Bouchard 2012 in rejecting Sæbø’s answer, namely
that find requires its complement clause to be headed by a predicate with a bindable
∗ I thank the SALT attendees for helpful feedback. Special thanks to Chris Barker for extended
discussion.
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judge argument in the syntax. I go on to show that Bouchard’s account, on which find
presupposes the contingency of its subjective propositional complement, is on the
right track but fails to distinguish adequately between the two types of subjectivity
mentioned above. I propose instead to adapt Barker’s (2002) dynamic framework
for vagueness to the analysis of taste predicates, though my proposal differs in
important ways from Barker’s (2013) own adaptation of his 2002 framework. My
answer to the question posed above is that find requires a context that supports
nonvacuous judge-dependent descriptive entailments (in the sense of Barker 2002)
in its complement; that is, find is used to make assertions about taste.
The broader goal, of course, is not simply to state accurately what find needs, but
to understand what the behavior of find reveals about subjectivity in natural language
and the proper linguistic and philosophical frameworks for analyzing it. On the
former score, I will argue that the kind of subjectivity involved in taste predications
is part of the world, while the kind of subjectivity involved in vague predications
is metalinguistic. On the latter score, I will suggest, following Bouchard, that
considerations about the syntax–semantics interface weigh in favor of a relativist
treatment of taste-based subjectivity and against a contextualist treatment.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I present the basic data on
find, discuss some problems with Sæbø’s contextualist analysis, and introduce some
concepts and terminology for distinguishing between the two types of subjectivity.
In section 3, I introduce Barker’s dynamic framework and show how it allows us to
capture distinctions between find and the closely related consider, while remaining
consonant with the presuppositional facts discussed by Bouchard (2012). Finally, in
section 4 I offer some thoughts on the grammatical and ontological status of taste
judgments, arguing that they must be treated as facts about the world and not merely
as objects of metalinguistic negotiation, contra Barker 2013 and Kennedy 2013.
2 Subjectivity and gradability
Here I provide a brief overview of the recent literature on subjectivity in taste
predicates and vague predicates, with the goal of establishing the core empirical
distinctions (section 2.1) and considering (and then setting aside) a prominent but
unsuccessful proposal for analyzing them (section 2.2). In section 2.3, I situate these
core empirical distinctions within a standard semantics of gradability, a clarifying
exercise that most of the existing literature neglects to undertake.
To give the basic story arc before delving into the details: Sæbø (2009) and
Kennedy (2013) proceed from the observation that natural-language subjectivity
comes in at least two varieties: one associated with taste predicates, the other with
ordinary vague predicates. Only the former is suitable in the complement of matrix
find. Sæbø takes this to indicate that the two varieties of subjective predicate are
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syntactically distinct, with those that occur felicitously in find complements contain-
ing a judge argument in the syntax.1 Bouchard (2012) provides counterexamples
to most of Sæbø’s arguments, casting doubt on the syntactic account of the distinc-
tion between the two types of subjectivity, though not on the underlying empirical
distinction itself.
2.1 Varieties of subjectivity
Evidence to support the view that there are two varieties of natural-language subjec-
tivity comes in part from “faultless disagreement” dialogues. In faultless disagree-
ment, two speakers (or, more generally, judges) express apparently contradictory
propositions (disagreement), yet neither speaker can be said to be wrong (fault-
lessness) (Kölbel 2002; Lasersohn 2005).2 Subjective terms that support faultless
disagreement dialogues include taste predicates like tasty and ordinary vague predi-
cates like tall, as shown in (1).
(1) Faultless disagreement:
a. A: The soup is tasty.
B: No, the soup is not tasty.
b. A: John is tall.
B: No, John is not tall.
As Kennedy (2013) observes, these two classes of adjective part ways in the
comparative degree, where taste predicates continue to support faultless disagreement
dialogues but ordinary vague predicates do not. The disagreement in (2a) is faultless;
in (2b), by contrast, one or the other of the speakers must be wrong.
(2) a. tastier: faultless disagreement
A: The tomato soup is tastier than the pea soup.
B: No, the tomato soup is not tastier than the pea soup.
b. taller: no faultless disagreement
A: John is taller than Bill.
B: No, John is not taller than Bill.
The disparity between the positive examples in (1) and the comparative examples
in (2) reflects an intuitive distinction regarding the sources of subjectivity for the two
1 Kennedy 2012, an unpublished manuscript, endorses Sæbø’s casting of the distinction in syntactic
terms. Kennedy 2013 is a revised version of that manuscript with a more equivocal stance on Sæbø’s
syntactic proposal.
2 For an argument that such faultlessness is illusory, see Stojanovic 2007. For a formal implementation
that eschews the use of judges, see Pearson 2013. For an argument that the felicity of denial is not a
reliable indicator of semantic contradiction, see Sundell 2011.
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types of adjective. Whereas judges may disagree about the tastiness of a particular
soup, they may not disagree about the height of an individual like John, which is
an objectively verifiable fact of the world. The subjectivity found in (1b) is thus
not subjectivity as regards John’s height itself, but rather subjectivity as regards the
operative standard of tallness. (Of course, speakers may disagree about standards of
tastiness, as well.)
As Sæbø and Kennedy note, the subjective matrix verb find appears to be sensi-
tive to this distinction, licensing only those complements that involve the kind of
subjectivity found in taste predicates, as shown in (3). In this, find contrasts with its
close relative consider, which licenses both kinds of subjectivity in its complement,
as shown in (4).
(3) a. I find the soup tasty.
b. # I find John tall.3
(4) a. I consider the soup tasty.
b. I consider John tall.
We thus have a grammatical phenomenon—the selectional sensitivity of find—to
parallel the intuitive distinction between the two types of subjectivity.
2.2 A contextualist proposal and its discontents
Sæbø uses this property of find to investigate the relative merits of relativist and
contextualist analyses of taste predicates. Proceeding from Stojanovic’s (2007)
observation that relativist and contextualist accounts are equivalent from a purely
semantic perspective, Sæbø turns to the syntax–semantics interface for evidence,
ultimately endorsing a contextualist position. On Sæbø’s contextualist view, taste
predicates must compose syntactically with a judge argument alongside the usual
individual argument (i.e., they are of type 〈e,〈e, t〉〉) and are thus typewise distinct
from ordinary predicates of type 〈e, t〉. What find needs, then, is a complement of the
appropriate type, with a judge argument to which the subject of find can be bound.
Sæbø advances three arguments from the syntax–semantics interface in favor of
the contextualist position. I briefly sketch each of them here, along with counterex-
amples and refutations offered by Bouchard (2012).
3 Sæbø (2009: 328) provides the prima facie counterexample These prices may be normal for perfumes,
but I still find them high. The adjective high is an ordinary vague predicate (since the amount of a
given price is an objective fact), yet it can be felicitously embedded under find here. Note, though,
that this use of high seems to mean not merely ‘higher than the cutoff for what counts as high’,
but ‘higher than the cutoff for what is appropriate’, or ‘too high for the purpose at hand’. I take
these meanings to involve subjectivity that goes beyond the meaning of the adjective and the positive
morpheme themselves—i.e., they involve subjectivity as regards appropriateness or purpose—and set
them aside for the present discussion. (On a related positive construction, see Fleisher 2011.)
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First, Sæbø (2009: 338) claims that coordination of subjective taste predicates
with nonsubjective predicates is infelicitous under find, citing examples like (5).
He observes that this follows naturally on an analysis in which taste predicates and
ordinary predicates are not of like type, but not on a relativist analysis in which the
judge is implemented as an index of evaluation.
(5) # She finds him handsome and under 45.
Bouchard (2012: 191ff.), however, points out that coordination of subjective and
nonsubjective predicates under find is not generally barred, citing examples like
those in (6). He proposes that Sæbø’s example (5) is infelicitous because it differs
from the alternative She finds him handsome only in its truth-value gap, i.e., the set
of worlds in which its presuppositions are not satisfied. (I refer the interested reader
to Bouchard’s dissertation for details.) The important point for present purposes
is that the infelicity of (5) cannot be due to a type clash brought about by the
syntax of coordination, since this would predict infelicity in (6) as well, contrary to
fact. Indeed, Sæbø’s contextualist analysis seems unable in principle to deal with
examples like those in (6).
(6) a. She finds no one at the party to be handsome and under 45.
b. She finds everyone at the party to be handsome or under 45.
Second, Sæbø (2009: 339) observes that contraposition of a nonsubjective re-
strictor and a subjective nuclear scope of a universal quantifier is infelicitous below
find, as in (7). He suggests that this is straightforwardly derivable in a contextualist
framework—find binds the judge argument of the embedded subjective main predi-
cate unpleasant in (7a) but finds nothing to bind with nonsubjective non-smokers in
(7b)—but not in a relativist one, where the judge index should be able to work its
effect without regard to the internal syntax of find’s complement.
(7) a. She finds all smokers to be unpleasant.
b. # She finds all pleasant people to be non-smokers.
Bouchard (2012: 205ff.) counters that the infelicity of (7b) is due to its information
structure. DPs in subject position headed by strong determiners tend to encode given
information, but Bouchard suggests that there is a conflict between givenness and
subjectivity, the latter requiring that the DP in question be able to have different
extensions for different judges.
Third and finally, Sæbø (2009: 340) notes that the focus structure of an embedded
clause can affect its acceptability under find, offering the minimal pair in (8). Sæbø
suggests that the nonsubjective material in the embedded clause in (8a), but not
in (8b), can be interpreted as presupposed. He sketches a DRT analysis on which
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the judge argument of beautiful remains open in the focus in (8a) and is bound by
a variable introduced in the presupposition, and suggests once again that treating
the judge as an index of evaluation, as on a relativist analysis, leaves one unable to
account for the contrast.
(8) a. I find that you are married to a beautiful man.
b. # I find that you know a beautiful man.
Bouchard (2012: 186ff.) disputes the notion that such focus behavior bears on the
contextualism-vs.-relativism debate, claiming that find always requires that the
nonsubjective material in its complement be presupposed (a matter discussed in
greater detail below in section 3.3). If the embedded verb know independently
resists being presupposed, as Sæbø suggests, then the infelicity of (8b) becomes, per
Bouchard, a case of presupposition failure rather than syntactic ill-formedness.
Bouchard thus casts Sæbø’s contextualist analysis of subjective taste predicates—
and, in turn, of find—into serious doubt. While the basic empirical distinction
between the two types of subjectivity sketched above in (1) and (2) still holds,
Sæbø’s contextualist account appears to miss the mark. We thus need an alternative
explanation of the behavior of find. In the next section, I lay the groundwork for this
by situating the two types of subjectivity within a standard semantics of gradability,
a move which does much to clarify precisely where subjectivity manifests itself in
taste predicates and in ordinary vague predicates.
2.3 Judge-dependent mappings vs. vague standards
Let us begin to make matters more precise. First, note that both taste predicates
and ordinary vague predicates are gradable. Following Kennedy 1999 and much
subsequent work, I take gradable predicates to denote measure functions that map
an individual to a degree on a scale; composition with a degree morpheme such as
positive POS or comparative -er then creates a predicate relating that individual’s
scalar value to some standard of comparison. In a given scalar predication, there
are thus two scalar values whose determination might be subjective: (i) the value
to which an individual is mapped by the measure function and (ii) the standard of
comparison.
With this framework for gradability as background, we may now recast the
distinction between the two types of subjectivity noted above as a distinction between
subjective mappings of individuals to scalar values (e.g., how tasty a particular soup
is) and subjective determination of vague standards (e.g., how tall one has to be to
count as tall). Let us call the former type of subjectivity MAPPING SUBJECTIVITY
and the latter type STANDARDS SUBJECTIVITY. A given sentence’s subjectivity
type(s) will be determined by the type of the adjective (taste predicate or ordinary
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vague predicate) in combination with the identity of the degree operator (positive or
comparative).4 Faultless disagreement dialogues, in turn, are licensed wherever one
or the other of the subjectivity types is present. I summarize the interactions among
these factors in (9).
(9) Derivation of subjectivity type
a. The soup is tasty. (taste predicate, positive)
Mapping value = the soup’s tastiness (MAPPING SUBJECTIVITY)
Standard value = cutoff for tasty (STANDARDS SUBJECTIVITY)
⇒ Subjectivity types: mapping, standards
b. John is tall. (vague predicate, positive)
Mapping value = John’s height (NO SUBJECTIVITY)
Standard value = cutoff for tall (STANDARDS SUBJECTIVITY)
⇒ Subjectivity type: standards
c. The tomato soup is tastier than the pea soup. (taste predicate, comparative)
Mapping value = tomato soup’s tastiness (MAPPING SUBJECTIVITY)
Standard value = pea soup’s tastiness (MAPPING SUBJECTIVITY)
⇒ Subjectivity type: mapping
d. John is taller than Bill. (vague predicate, comparative)
Mapping value = John’s height (NO SUBJECTIVITY)
Standard value = Bill’s height (NO SUBJECTIVITY)
⇒ Subjectivity type: none
Let us reconsider the examples from (1) and (2) in light of (9). In (9a) and (9b),
we see that the taste predicate tasty supports mapping subjectivity—i.e., different
judges may map a given soup to different values on the scale of tastiness—but the
ordinary vague predicate tall does not, as it simply maps an individual to its (judge-
independent) degree of height. Both types of predicate, however, support standards
subjectivity in the positive degree; in the terminology of Kennedy & McNally 2005,
they are both relative adjectives, with the precise cutoff for what counts as tasty or
tall dependent on contextual factors including subjectivity. Faultless disagreement
dialogues are thus supported in both cases in (1). By contrast, in the comparatives in
4 Kennedy 2013 uses the terms EVALUATIVE and DIMENSIONAL for the classes of predicate that I call
taste predicates and ordinary vague predicates, respectively. The key point is that there is a lexical
semantic distinction between the two gradable adjective classes, independent of those adjectives’
interactions with the various degree morphemes.
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(2), which are dissected in (9c) and (9d), the standard of comparison is provided not
by the positive morpheme but by another mapping yielded by the measure function
(the pea soup’s tastiness or Bill’s height). In (9c)/(2a), with tastier, we thus have
two instances of mapping subjectivity, and so faultless disagreement is supported. In
(9d)/(2b), we have neither mapping subjectivity nor standards subjectivity, as the
standard of comparison is now produced by the nonsubjective mapping of Bill to a
degree of height; faultless disagreement is thus impossible here.
By incorporating basic elements of the semantics of gradability into our analysis
and adopting the distinction between mapping subjectivity and standards subjec-
tivity, we gain a better and more fine-grained way of talking about subjectivity in
particular examples. We also get additional insight into the distribution of faultless
disagreement dialogues in (1) and (2): such dialogues depend on the presence of at
least one type of subjectivity.
Moreover, we can begin to understand the behavior of find shown in (3): it
appears that find felicitously embeds only those complements that involve mapping
subjectivity. Consider, by contrast, felicitously embeds both kinds of subjectivity.
Confirmation of this generalization comes from examining the behavior of find and
consider not just with embedded positives but also with embedded comparatives.
Using the subjectivity-type derivations in (9) as a template, I show the full paradigms
for find in (10) and for consider in (11). Find is felicitous only when its clausal com-
plement supports mapping subjectivity; consider is felicitous when either mapping
or standards subjectivity is present.
(10) a. I find the soup tasty.
⇒ Subjectivity types: mapping, standards (cf. (9a))
b. # I find John tall.
⇒ Subjectivity type: standards (cf. (9b))
c. I find the tomato soup tastier than the pea soup.
⇒ Subjectivity type: mapping (cf. (9c))
d. # I find John taller than Bill.
⇒ Subjectivity type: none (cf. (9d))
(11) a. I consider the soup tasty.
⇒ Subjectivity types: mapping, standards (cf. (9a))
b. I consider John tall.
⇒ Subjectivity type: standards (cf. (9b))
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c. I consider the tomato soup tastier than the pea soup.
⇒ Subjectivity type: mapping (cf. (9c))
d. # I consider John taller than Bill.
⇒ Subjectivity type: none (cf. (9d))
With our analysis of subjective terms now situated within a semantic framework
for gradability, I turn to the task of fitting the analysis of subjectivity into a dynamic
semantic framework. As I show in the next section, examination of a wider range of
examples reveals that felicity below find depends not just on the presence of mapping
subjectivity (i.e., on the lexical semantics of the adjective), but on the presence of a
discourse context that supports contentful entailments about those mappings.
3 A dynamic framework for subjectivity
3.1 Descriptive vs. sharpening entailments
I begin by introducing the dynamic system of Barker 2002. Barker’s analysis
is designed to capture the behavior of vague predicates like tall. It does so by
capitalizing on the aforementioned distinction between mapping values and standard
values in scalar predication. One of Barker’s core insights is that the effect of the
contextual update brought about by a scalar predication will depend on whether
the update narrows the context set’s range of mapping values, its range of standard
values, or both; i.e., the nature of the update will depend in part on the state of the
input context. In adapting Barker’s system to deal with taste predicates, we thus
must consider what happens when the mapping values are not objective (as with tall)
but subjective and tied to a judge (as with tasty).5
At the heart of Barker’s (2002) analysis is the following claim: for a vague
predicate in the positive degree, the value to which an individual is mapped by the
measure function is a piece of information about the world, but the standard of
comparison is an object of metalinguistic negotiation. An utterance of the sentence
John is tall can be used to narrow the range of values of John’s height in the context
set (by eliminating any worlds in which John’s height fails to exceed the standard
in that world), or it can be used to narrow the range of values of the standard of
comparison (by eliminating any worlds in which the standard meets or exceeds John’s
height in that world).6 The utterance can thus have what Barker calls an ordinary
DESCRIPTIVE use, in which the context set is filtered according to the updated facts
5 Barker (2013) takes a somewhat different approach in adapting his 2002 system in order to deal with
taste predicates. See section 4 for discussion.
6 In fact, as Barker (2002) notes, the context is typically such that an utterance of a vague predicate has
both of these effects simultaneously.
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of the world, or it can have a metalinguistic SHARPENING use, in which the context
set is filtered according to the updated metalinguistic usage conditions (or both).
By constraining the context set, we can block one or the other of these effects
and highlight the other. Barker (2002: 2) offers the following example: if John’s
height is known to the interlocutors (e.g., because John is standing near them), then
an utterance of John is tall. . .
. . . is not a descriptive use in the usual sense. I have not provided any
new information about the world, or at least no new information about
[John]’s height. In fact, assuming that tall means roughly ‘having a
maximal degree of height greater than a certain contextually-supplied
standard’, I haven’t even provided you with any new information
about the truth conditions of the word tall. All I have done is given
you guidance concerning what the prevailing relevant standard for
tallness happens to be in our community; in particular, that standard
must be no greater than [John]’s maximal degree of height. . . . My
purpose in uttering [John is tall] under such circumstances would be
nothing more than to communicate something about how to use a
certain word appropriately – it would be a metalinguistic use.
If the context set is such that the mapping value of a gradable predicate as applied
to a given individual is fixed—as it is with John’s height in Barker’s example—then
an utterance of that gradable predicate in the positive degree will have no ordinary
descriptive entailments. In Barker’s example, the utterance of John is tall will not
eliminate any live mapping values of John’s height in the context set: they are all
the same to begin with (modulo tolerance; see footnote 9), since John’s height is an
objective fact of the world and is known to the interlocutors. Instead, the utterance
can have only sharpening entailments, entailments that eliminate live values of the
standard of comparison. The effect of the utterance in such a context is, on this view,
a purely metalinguistic one.
Barker (2002) discusses a range of linguistic phenomena that are sensitive to
the distinction between descriptive and sharpening entailments. I propose to add
the embedding selectivity of matrix find to the list of such phenomena. Indeed, I
believe that the descriptive-vs.-sharpening distinction is the key to understanding the
behavior of find. Before demonstrating this, though, we must first determine how to
model the judge dependency of taste predicates in a Barker-style dynamic system. It
is to this task that I now turn.
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3.2 Taste mappings
The basic question to be addressed in our dynamic analysis of taste predicates is
which side of the semantic/pragmatic ledger the associated scalar mappings should
be recorded on. The core empirical distinction between taste predicates and ordinary
vague predicates is that, with taste predicates, the value to which a given thing is
mapped by the measure function at a given world can vary from judge to judge:
you might find a given soup tastier than I do. Is judge dependency of this sort
a metalinguistic matter like the determination of vague standards, or are judge-
dependent mappings instead simply facts of the world?
I argue here that the judge-dependent mappings associated with taste predicates
are facts of the world, not negotiable metalinguistic norms (contra Barker 2013; see
section 4). I take no philosophical stance on what sort of facts they are (sensory
percepts, opinions, something else entirely?); for linguistic purposes, all that matters
is that our semantics treat them as facts of the world just as it does objective facts
like John’s height. The judge-dependent nature of taste predicates means, of course,
that the associated scalar mappings must be indexed to a judge: there is no unique
tastiness value to which a given soup is mapped at a given world, but rather a range
consisting of those values to which each judge maps the soup according to his or her
own taste. Once we acknowledge and control for this factor, we can show that taste
mappings are qualitatively different from vague standards.7
In order to see this, let us construct a scenario similar to the one from Barker’s
example above. Assume a context set c1 = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}, with the worlds as
specified in table 1. There are two judges (j1 and j2), and at each world we have two
values associated with each judge: the value to which the judge maps the soup on
the scale of tastiness and the value that the judge takes to be the standard of tastiness
(for j1, these are tast j1(soup) and s j1(JtastyK), respectively). Now imagine that, in
context c1, we hear the following dialogue:
(12) j1: I find the soup tasty.
j2: I do not find the soup tasty.
This dialogue—or, more precisely, the successive contextual updates that it effects—
narrows down the context from c1 to c1′ = {w2, w4}, as those are the worlds in which
tast j1(soup) exceeds s j1(JtastyK) and tast j2(soup) fails to exceed s j2(JtastyK).8
7 As Chris Barker (p.c.) notes, perspectival shifts in counterfactuals are unable to shift the judge in
the way that they can shift indexical reference; compare If I were you, I would find the soup tasty to
#If I were you, the soup would be tasty. It is not clear to me that this is a problem for the view that
judge-dependent mappings are part of the world. A good chunk of Lasersohn 2005, for instance, is
devoted to detailing the differences between the grammatical behavior of judges and that of indexicals.
8 Strictly speaking, there is an intermediate context c1int = {w1, w2, w3, w4} in between c1 and c1′ that
results from j1’s utterance.
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tast j1(soup) tast j2(soup) s j1(JtastyK) s j2(JtastyK)
w1 85 60 50 50
w2 60 35 50 50
w3 75 75 40 50
w4 75 75 45 80
w5 40 30 55 45
Table 1 tast j1 = tastiness per judge 1; s j2 = standard per judge 2; etc.
The dialogue in (12), uttered in context c1, yields a narrowed range of both taste
mappings and possible standards of tastiness. That is, on the assumption that taste
mappings are facts of the world, it has both descriptive and sharpening entailments.
Now imagine that, instead of c1, we start from context c2 = {w1, w2}. In c2, the
judges agree on the standard of tastiness but differ in the tastiness values to which
they map the soup.9 In c2, the dialogue in (12) yields the updated context c2′ =
{w2}. The result is a narrowed range of taste mappings (for each judge), but no
change in the range of standards of tastiness inherited from the input context: a
purely descriptive usage (again, assuming that taste mappings are facts).
Let us pause to take stock of what we have so far learned about find. The
dialogue in (12) has shown us that find happily embeds a taste predicate (and allows
for faultless disagreement dialogues) in two kinds of contexts: (i) those that support
narrowing both the range of taste mappings and the range of standards (as with
c1), and (ii) those that support narrowing only the range of taste mappings (as with
c2). What about contexts that support narrowing only the range of vague standards
of tastiness, i.e., pure sharpening contexts? The context c3 = {w3, w4} is such a
context: in c3, the two judges agree on how tasty the soup is but disagree on where
the standard lies.10 To begin, note that c3 supports pure sharpening in a canonical
faultless disagreement dialogue like the one in (13).
(13) j1: The soup is tasty.
j2: No, the soup is not tasty.
9 One might reasonably doubt whether it is indeed possible for the judges to agree, in an objectively
verifiable sense, on a subjective parameter like this. I believe that what is of linguistic semantic
importance for us is not that the judges agree objectively, but merely that they believe that they agree.
That much, I believe, suffices to yield a context set like c2 = {w1, w2}.
Note also that, for simplicity of exposition, the toy model contexts c2 and c3 (below) ignore the
tolerance assumption (Barker 2013: 254). I believe the account here is perfectly compatible with the
tolerance assumption, though for now this remains to be demonstrated.
10 Once again, I believe that all that is necessary in order to get a context like c3 is for the two judges to
believe that they agree on the soup’s tastiness, e.g., because they rated it the same on a scorecard,
because they know themselves to have similar tastes in soup, or similar (cf. footnote 9).
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When uttered in c3, the dialogue in (13) yields the updated context c3′ = {w4}.
That is, even though the two judges agree on the tastiness value of the soup, they
disagree on whether it is appropriate to call it tasty tout court: j2 has higher standards
than j1. This is analogous to what would happen if we extended Barker’s scenario
above: two judges see John and one says John is tall, and then the other replies No,
John is not tall. In both (13) and the extended Barker scenario, the judges are having
a disagreement about the appropriate usage conditions of a gradable predicate with a
vague standard in the positive degree; in both cases, the context is constrained so
as only to support the sharpening entailments that are associated with this kind of
metalinguistic disagreement. In this connection, note that it might be more natural
in these scenarios for the second speaker to reply with I wouldn’t call it tasty or I
wouldn’t call him tall, formulations that highlight the metalinguistic nature of the
proffered denial.
Now consider what happens in context c3 when we embed the faultless disagree-
ment dialogue from (13) below find, i.e., when we change it to the dialogue from
(12). The contrast between embedding below find and embedding below consider is
particularly instructive:
(14) a. # find: infelicitous in c3 = {w3, w4}
j1: I find the soup tasty.
j2: I do not find the soup tasty.
b. consider: felicitous in c3 = {w3, w4}
j1: I consider the soup tasty.
j2: I do not consider the soup tasty.
The dialogues in (14) should each narrow the context to c3′ = {w4}, just like the
unembedded faultless disagreement dialogue in (13). Evidently this is possible with
consider but not with find. That is, the two judges cannot use the dialogue in (14a)
in a context in which they know that they agree on the soup’s tastiness value but
differ in their standards; instead, they must use a dialogue like (14b), with consider,
to express such a metalinguistic disagreement.
We thus see that find is not happy with a pure sharpening context like c3. This
is the case even when its complement contains a gradable predicate that supports
mapping subjectivity, like tasty. The Barker-style dynamic approach lends important
new insight into the nature of the subjectivity requirement associated with find: find
imposes both the lexical semantic requirement that its complement support mapping
subjectivity (as discussed in section 2.3) and the discourse requirement that the
context support nonvacuous entailments about those mappings.
This latter requirement, in turn, supports the view that taste mappings are facts
of the world and not objects of metalinguistic negotiation like vague standards. The
difference between the felicity of find in c2 and its infelicity in c3 is illustrative: if
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taste mappings were metalinguistic, then all else being equal we would expect find
to be just as infelicitous in c2, where only entailments regarding the range of taste
mappings are available, as it is in c3. Indeed, if taste mappings were metalinguistic,
then we would expect find to be equally infelicitous in c1, where both kinds of
entailment are available. If, instead, we view taste mappings as facts of the world—
i.e., as facts that give rise to ordinary descriptive entailments—then the exceptional
infelicity of find in the pure sharpening context c3 immediately makes sense.
3.3 Assertions about taste
To summarize the preceding discussion: find requires a complement that supports
mapping subjectivity in a context that supports nonvacuous entailments about those
mappings. Furthermore, those entailments are not metalinguistic sharpening entail-
ments, but ordinary descriptive entailments; i.e., subjective taste mappings are facts
of the world. I take this collection of requirements to suggest an explanation that I
frame for now in the form of a slogan: find is used to make assertions about taste.
We can illustrate this by considering the behavior of find in the light of Stalnaker’s
(1978) discussion of assertion. Stalnaker’s criterion of narrowing is particularly
relevant here. The narrowing criterion—i.e., the requirement that an asserted propo-
sition have the effect of filtering some but not all worlds from the context set—must
be understood in this case to do its filtering not with respect to the truth value of
the entire propositional complement of find, but rather with respect to the range
of mapping values associated with a given judge. The mapping values, as argued
above, are facts of the world; the truth value of find’s complement, by contrast,
depends in part on the value of the metalinguistically negotiable positive standard of
comparison (in examples like (12), that is). I take it that to make an assertion about
taste is to narrow down the context set according solely to the facts of the world.
This is what makes find infelicitous in context c3 above. In c3, the range of mapping
values associated with each judge is fixed in the input context, and so there is no
way to filter out some but not all of the worlds in the context set solely with respect
to those mappings. Since there are no contentful descriptive entailments to be had
about taste mappings in c3, there is no contentful assertion to be made about taste.
By contrast, it is perfectly possible to filter the context set in c3 with respect to the
truth value of the embedded proposition, as truth-value filtering is indifferent to the
distinction between descriptive and sharpening entailments; and indeed, this is what
happens with consider in (14b).
The view that find is used to make assertions about taste also serves as a useful
addition to Bouchard’s (2012) analysis of the presuppositional behavior of find.
Bouchard observes that find presupposes the nonsubjective material in its com-
plement; for example, the sentence I find that John gave a good talk presupposes
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that John gave a talk. In order to capture this phenomenon, Bouchard (2012: 173)
proposes that find triggers what he calls the Subjective Contingency Presupposition,
which requires that it be possible for a judge to judge find’s complement true and that
it be possible for a judge to judge find’s complement false. Apart from accounting
for the presuppositional behavior of find, this also has the effect of deriving the
mapping subjectivity requirement of find discussed above: as Bouchard shows, a
complement that lacks a subjective component will violate the Subjective Contin-
gency Presupposition due to its ineluctable failure to vary in truth value from judge
to judge.11
As it stands, however, the Subjective Contingency Presupposition fails to predict
the discourse requirement of find, namely that the context support nonvacuous de-
scriptive entailments regarding the taste mappings in its complement. The Subjective
Contingency Presupposition has nothing to say about why find in (12)/(14a) should
be felicitous in the mixed and pure descriptive contexts c1 and c2 but infelicitous in
the pure sharpening context c3. By making reference only to the truth value of find’s
complement, Bouchard runs afoul of the truth value’s aforementioned indifference to
the descriptive/sharpening distinction. Indeed, the requirement that there be possible
judgments making find’s complement true and making it false is met in c3—i.e., the
Subjective Contingency Presupposition is satisfied—yet find is infelicitous in that
context. If, by contrast, we understand find’s role to be one of making assertions
about taste, then we correctly predict its infelicity in c3: this is due to a failure of
narrowing with respect to mappings, as discussed immediately above.
A fully satisfactory treatment of find might combine Bouchard’s Subjective
Contingency Presupposition with the present claim that find makes assertions about
taste. These proposals operate at different levels—the former being a lexical semantic
requirement, the latter a discourse requirement—and are compatible as far as I can
tell. What I hope to have shown here is that any satisfactory treatment of find
must take into account the state of the discourse, and that the Barker-style dynamic
framework sketched above is a promising option.
4 Subjectivity metalinguistic and not
Here I address a few lingering issues regarding the relationship between the semantic
framework for gradability discussed in section 2.3 and the dynamic framework
discussed in section 3. I also briefly discuss the recent proposal of Barker 2013,
which extends the dynamic system of Barker 2002 in a manner very different from
what I have proposed above.
11 Bouchard’s analysis also derives a number of correct results about presuppositions associated
with quantifiers and negation embedded in the complement of find; I refer the interested reader
to Bouchard’s dissertation for details.
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tast j1(tomato) tast j2(tomato) tast j1(pea) tast j2(pea)
w6 75 75 40 50
w7 75 75 45 80
Table 2 tast j1(tomato) = tastiness of tomato soup per judge 1; etc.
In section 2.3 I sketched a distinction between mapping subjectivity and standards
subjectivity. I went on in section 3 to argue that the judge-dependent scalar mappings
involved in mapping subjectivity are associated with ordinary descriptive entailments,
while the vague standards involved in standards subjectivity are associated with
metalinguistic sharpening entailments. It is important to keep in mind that not all
standards of comparison are vague standards like those found with relative adjectives
(Kennedy & McNally 2005) in the positive degree. Indeed, in (9c) we saw that the
standard of comparison with a taste predicate in the comparative degree supports
mapping subjectivity, not standards subjectivity (which I henceforth call vague-
standards subjectivity, in the interest of terminological clarity). Translated into our
dynamic framework, this means that not all standards of comparison are associated
with metalinguistic sharpening entailments: only the vague standards associated
with relative adjectives in the positive degree give rise to sharpening.
If we examine taste predicates in the comparative degree, we discover that find
can in fact be used in contexts where the judges agree on the mapping value of the
subject of taste predication. For example, in context c4 = {w6, w7}, with the worlds
specified as in table 2, the dialogue in (15) is perfectly felicitous.
(15) j1: I find the tomato soup tastier than the pea soup.
j2: I do not find the tomato soup tastier than the pea soup.
The dialogue in (15) successfully narrows the input context c4 to the updated context
c4′ = {w7}. This is despite the fact that the various scalar values involved in c4
are equivalent to those in c3, where find was infelicitous. The crucial difference,
of course, is that the vague standards of tastiness s j1(JtastyK) and s j2(JtastyK) from
c3 have been replaced with the mapping values tast j1(pea) and tast j2(pea) in c4.
Whereas positive scalar predications with taste predicates (as in (12)) involve com-
paring a judge-dependent mapping value (a fact of the world) to a vague standard
(an object of metalinguistic negotiation), comparative scalar predications with taste
predicates (as in (15)) involve comparing two judge-dependent mapping values (two
facts of the world). In the case at hand, these are the degree to which the judge finds
the tomato soup tasty and the degree to which the judge finds the pea soup tasty.
The reason for the felicity of the dialogue in (15) should be perfectly clear. The
contextual update from c4 to c4′—i.e., the narrowing from {w6, w7} to {w7}—is
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an instance of narrowing with respect to the standards of comparison tast j1(pea)
and tast j2(pea). Unlike dialogue (12) in c3, dialogue (15) in c4 involves standards
of comparison that are judge-dependent mappings of an object to a value on the
scale; i.e., the standards of comparison are facts of the world, not metalinguistically
negotiable norms. It is thus perfectly felicitous to use dialogues like (15), with find,
in contexts like c4, despite the fact that the judges agree on the mapping value for
the embedded subject. As long as the judges disagree on the mapping value for the
standard of comparison, judge-dependent descriptive entailments are supported, and
we can use find to make assertions about taste.
These considerations reinforce the idea that there is a qualitative difference
between the subjectivity involved in judge-dependent scalar mappings and the sub-
jectivity involved in the determination of vague standards associated with the positive
degree (this is also the conclusion of Kennedy 2013, though he does not explore the
dynamic/discourse factors examined here). As the data from comparatives show,
find requires a context that supports nonvacuous entailments about mapping values,
regardless of whether those entailments involve narrowing with respect to the em-
bedded subject’s mapping value or with respect to the standard of comparison. Put
another way, the crucial factor that renders a context inhospitable for find is not a
limitation to narrowing with respect to the standard of comparison, but a limitation to
narrowing with respect to a vague, positive standard of comparison. As I have argued
above, we can make sense of this by treating the offending entailments about vague
standards as metalinguistic sharpening entailments, while treating entailments about
judge-dependent scalar mappings (whether standards or not) as ordinary descriptive
entailments. If find is used to make assertions about taste, then it requires a context
that supports the latter kind of entailment.
The bifurcated perspective on subjectivity developed here is drastically different
from the one advanced by Barker (2013), who aims to bring all subjectivity into
the metalinguistic fold. Barker (2013: 250) writes of taste predicates that they
involve “norms for which certain aspects of an object are relevant for the judgment in
question, . . . as well as the norms for convolving the relevant aspects into a judgment
of the degree to which the object possesses the property in question.” He goes on
to suggest that “such norms constitute part of the discourse, rather than being part
of the world under discussion.” Kennedy (2013: §4), though he recognizes find’s
sensitivity to the distinction between what I have called mapping subjectivity and
vague-standards subjectivity, pursues a similar unifying line of explanation:
[J]ust as there is uncertainty about how the dimensions involved
in vague standard calculation are weighted and applied in different
conversational situations, there is uncertainty about how the dimen-
sions of qualitative assessment are weighted and applied by different
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judges. In the former case, the uncertainty leads to uncertainty about
standards; in the latter case, it leads to uncertainty about orderings.
I believe that these attempts to assimilate mapping subjectivity to vague-standards
subjectivity fly in the face of intuition. While it is certainly possible for judges to
disagree about the norms or dimensions of assessment governing the appropriate
use of a taste predicate, I believe that judge-dependent variation in the experience
of taste is an irreducible fact of the world, one directly reflected in the mapping of
objects to values on the associated scale by a given judge. A dispute about which of
two soups is tastier need not be a dispute rooted in metalinguistic uncertainty about
the normative usage of the word tasty; it can simply be a dispute about how the world
is. By contrast, a dispute about whether John (whose height is common knowledge)
is tall is inevitably a metalinguistic dispute about the normative usage of the positive
form tall. As we have seen, the distinction is supported by an independent linguistic
diagnostic: the sensitivity of the matrix verb find.
One of Barker’s (2013) goals in proposing that all subjectivity is metalinguistic
is to explore the possibility of accounting for subjectivity without resort to a relativist
treatment like that of Lasersohn 2005. I have little to add to what others have said on
this score, but I believe that Bouchard (2012), in weighing considerations from the
syntax–semantics interface, makes a strong case against the contextualist account of
Sæbø 2009 and in favor of relativism (see section 2.2). The discourse conditions on
the felicity of find that we have examined are likewise consistent with a relativist
treatment: it is clear from our discussion that a predicate’s supporting mapping
subjectivity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for embedding below find
(think of (12) in c1 vs. c3). It thus strikes me as unlikely that the contextualist’s
syntactic/type-theoretic framing of what find needs can offer a satisfactory account.
Certainly there remain many open questions regarding subjectivity, the require-
ments of find, and the account explored here. One issue that space considerations
preclude me from examining concerns the specifics of narrowing in assertions about
taste. Must taste assertions narrow the range of live mapping values associated with
a particular judge, or is it sufficient for such an assertion to filter out worlds with
mapping values in the middle of the input range (i.e., because said mapping value
fails to exceed the standard in that world)? Are there standards associated with each
judge, as I have sketched in tables 1 and 2, or is there a single standard in each
world, as Barker (2013) suggests? Detailed investigation of these issues must await
future research. For now, I hope simply to have shown that the qualitative distinction
between judge-dependent mapping subjectivity and vague-standards subjectivity is
thoroughgoing and real, and that a dynamic treatment offers some insight into find’s
sensitivity to that distinction.
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